By E. J. Lowe
A scientific evaluate of recent metaphysics, A Survey of Metaphysics covers the entire most crucial themes within the box. It adopts the really conventional belief of metaphysics as a subject matter that bargains with the inner most questions that may be raised about the basic constitution of fact as an entire. The e-book is split into six major sections that deal with the next subject matters: id and alter, necessity and essence, causation, organisation and occasions, area and time, and universals and details. It makes a speciality of modern perspectives and matters all through, instead of at the heritage of metaphysics.
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Extra info for A Survey of Metaphysics
This combination of views is not contradictory, but it is odd. Call my (living) brain and body A. If (2) fails to entail (1), then there is a possible world in which I occupy a completely different brain and body, B. If (1) entails (2), then in every world in which A exists, I occupy A. This means that there is no world in which A and B both exist and I occupy B. But if it is possible for me to occupy B, and B and A are completely distinct, non-overlapping, entities, why is it be impossible for me to occupy B in a world in which A also exists?
Nor is ‘exists’ ambiguous: different kinds of thing exist (humans, numbers, trees, rocks etc), but there are not different concepts of existence. The quantiﬁer view treats our other existential sentences in like fashion. , it’s not the case that there is a unicorn). These all seem intuitively acceptable renderings. Still the matter is hardly settled. What considerations might help decide between the property and quantiﬁer views? Deciding between the property and quantifier views (i) Historically both views have had their defenders.
The latter concept is stipulated to be like memory in all phenomenological and causal respects, yet does not presuppose identity. g. as a result of a donor brain graft, I can have q-memories of someone else’s experiences. What we call memories are just q-memories of our own experiences. Q-memories thus yield knowledge of one’s own, or another’s, past. 9 Condition (ii) is also open to question. To start with, if (1) and (2) described the same fact, then there would be no reason to regard (2) as reducible to (1) rather than vice versa.